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Health care extends life. Over the past half century, Americans spent a rising
shareoftotaleconomicresourcesonhealthandenjoyedsubstantiallylongerlives
as a result. Debate on health policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health
spending. We investigate an issue central to this debate: Is the growth of health
spending the rational response to changing economic conditionsnotably the
growth of income per person? We develop a model based on standard economic
assumptions and argue that this is indeed the case. Standard preferencesof the
kind used widely in economics to study consumption, asset pricing, and labor
supplyimply that health spending is a superior good with an income elasticity
wellaboveone. Aspeoplegetricherandconsumptionrises,themarginalutilityof
consumptionfallsrapidly. Spendingonhealthtoextendlifeallowsindividualsto
purchase additional periods of utility. The marginal utility of life extension does
not decline. As a result, the optimal composition of total spending shifts toward
health, and the health share grows along with income. This effect exists despite
sharpdiminishingreturnsinthetechnologyoflifeextension. Inprojectionsbased
on the quantitative analysis of our model, the optimal health share of spending
seems likely to exceed 30 percent by the middle of the century.
*We are grateful to David Cutler, Amy Finkelstein, Victor Fuchs, Alan Garber, Michael
Grossman, Emmett Keeler, Ron Lee, Tomas Philipson, David Romer, and participants at
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1. INTRODUCTION
TheUnitedStatesdevotesarisingshareofitstotalresourcestohealthcare.
The share was 5.2 percent in 1950, 9.4 percent in 1975, and 15.4 percent in
2000. Over the same period, health has improved. The life expectancy of an
American born in 1950 was 68.2 years, of one born in 1975, 72.6 years, and





of lifelife expectancyand quality of lifeconsumption. People value
health spending because it allows them to live longer and to enjoy better
lives. In our analysis, the rise in the health share occurs because health is
a superior good with an income elasticity well above one. Income growth
leads consumption and health spending to rise, and the marginal utilities of
both consumption and health spending to fall. But saturation occurs faster in
consumption than in health spending. As people grow richer, consumption
rises but they devote an increasing share of resources to health care.
Inourapproach,standardpreferencesofthekindeconomistsusetostudy
issues ranging from consumption to asset pricing to labor supplyare able
to explain the rising share of health spending. As consumption increases,
the marginal utility of consumption falls quickly. In contrast, extending life
does not run into the same kind of diminishing returns. Living an additional
year allows a person to enjoy the same new ow of utility as from previous
extensions of lifetime.
Many of the important questions related to health involve the institutional
arrangements that govern its nancingespecially Medicare and employer-
numerous seminars and NBER meetings for helpful comments. Jones thanks the Center for
Economic Demography and Aging at Berkeley for 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provided health insurance. One approach would be to introduce these insti-
tutions into our model and to examine the allocation of resources that results.
We take an alternative approach. We examine the allocation of resources
that maximizes social welfare in our model. We abstract from the compli-
cated institutions that shape spending in the United States and ask a more
basicquestion: fromasocialwelfarestandpoint, howmuchshouldthenation
spend on health care, and what is the time path of optimal health spending?
Welookattheseissuesfromtwopointsofview,rstunderthehypothesisthat
historical levels of health care were optimal and second under the hypothesis
that they were not. In the second case, we make progress by drawing on the
results of a large body of existing research on the value of a statistical life.
The recent health literature has emphasized the importance of technolog-
ical change as an explanation for the rising health sharefor example, see
Newhouse (1992). According to this explanation, the invention of new and
expensive medical technologies causes health spending to rise over time. Al-
though the development of new technologies unquestionably plays a role in
the rise of health spending, the technological explanation is incomplete for at
least two reasons.
First, expensive health technologies do not need to be used just because
they are invented. Although distortions in health insurance in the United
States might result in over-use of expensive new technologies, health shares
of GDP have risen in virtually every advanced country in the world, despite
wide variation in systems for allocating health care (Jones 2003). We inves-
tigate whether the social payoff associated with the use of new technologies
is in line with the cost. Second, the invention of the new technologies is itself
endogenous: Why is the U.S. investing so much in order to invent these ex-
pensivetechnologies? Byfocusingexplicitlyonthesocialvalueofextending
life and how this value changes over time, we shed light on these questions.4 HALL AND JONES
We begin by documenting the facts about aggregate health spending and
life expectancy, the two key variables in our model. We then present a simple
stylizedmodelthatmakessomestrongassumptionsbutthatdeliversourbasic
results. From this foundation, we consider a richer and more realistic frame-
work and develop a full dynamic model of health spending. The remainder
of the paper estimates the parameters of the model and discusses a number of
projections of future health spending derived from the model.
OurapproachisclosestinspirittothetheoreticalpapersofGrossman(1972)
andEhrlichandChuma(1990),whoconsidertheoptimalchoiceofconsump-
tion and health spending in the presence of a quality-quantity tradeoff. Our
workisalsorelatedtoalargeliteratureonthevalueoflifeandthewillingness
ofpeopletopaytoreducemortalityrisk. ClassicreferencesincludeSchelling
(1968) and Usher (1973). Arthur (1981), Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984),
Murphy and Topel (2003), and Ehrlich and Yin (2004) are more recent exam-
plesthatincludesimulationsofthewillingnesstopaytoreducemortalityrisk
and calculations of the value of life. Nordhaus (2003) and Becker, Philipson
and Soares (2005) conclude that increases in longevity have been roughly
as important to welfare as increases in non-health consumption, both for the
United States and for the world as a whole.
We build on this literature in two ways. First and foremost, the focus of
our paper is on understanding the determinants of the aggregate health share.
The existing literature focuses on individual-level spending and willingness
topaytoreducemortality. Second,weconsiderabroaderclassofpreferences
for longevity and consumption. Many earlier papers specialize for their nu-
merical results to constant relative risk aversion utility, with an elasticity of
marginal utility that is between zero and one. In part, this restriction occurs
because these papers do not consider a constant term in ow utility. As we
show below, careful attention to the constant is crucial to understanding the
rising health share. In particular, when a constant is included, standard utilityTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 5
functions that exhibit a rapidly declining marginal utility of consumption are
admissible. This is the key to the rising health share in the model.
2. BASIC FACTS
We will be concerned with the allocation of total resources to health and
other uses. We believe that the most appropriate measure of total resources
is consumption plus government purchases of goods and services. That is,
we treat investment and net imports as intermediate products. Similarly, we
measurespendingonhealthasthedeliveryofhealthservicestothepublicand
do not include investment in medical facilities. Thus we differ conceptually
(but hardly at all quantitatively) from other measures that include investment
in both the numerator and denominator. When we speak of consumption of
goods and services, we include government purchases of non-health goods
and services.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of total spending devoted to health care, ac-
cording to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. The numerator
is consumption of health services plus government purchases of health ser-
vices and the denominator is consumption plus total government purchases
of goods and services. The fraction has a sharp upward trend, but growth is
irregular. In particular, the fraction grew rapidly in the early 1990s, attened
in the late 1990s, and resumed growth after 2000.
Figure 2 shows life expectancy at birth for the United States. Following
the tradition in demography, this life expectancy measure is not expected
remaining years of life (which depends on unknown future mortality rates),
butislifeexpectancyforahypotheticalindividualwhofacesthecross-section
of mortality rates from a given year. Life expectancy has grown about 1.7
years per decade. It shows no sign of slowing over the 50 years reported in
the gure. In the rst half of the 20th century, however, life expectancy grew
at about twice this rate, so a longer times series would show some curvature.6 HALL AND JONES
FIGURE 1. The Health Share in the United States










Note: The numerator of the health share is consumption of health services plus government
purchases of health services and the denominator is consumption plus total government
purchases of goods and services. For further information on sources, see Section 5.
3. BASIC MODEL
We begin with a model based on the simple but unrealistic assumption that
mortality is the same in all age groups. We also assume that preferences are
unchanging over time, and income and productivity are constant. This model
sets the stage for our full model where we incorporate age-specic mortality
andproductivitygrowth. AswewillshowinSection4, thestarkassumptions
we make in this section lead the full dynamic model to collapse to the simple
static problem considered here.
The economy consists of a collection of people of different ages who are
otherwise identical, allowing us to focus on a representative person. Let x
denotetheperson'sstateofhealth, whichwewillcallhealthstatus. Themor-
talityrateofanindividualistheinverseofherhealthstatus,1=x. SincepeopleTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 7
FIGURE 2. Life Expectancy in the United States









Note: Life expectancy at birth data are from Table 12 of National Vital Statistics Report
Volume 51, Number 3 United States Life Tables, 2000", December 19, 2002. Center for
Disease Control.8 HALL AND JONES
of all ages face this same mortality rate, x is also equal to life expectancy.
For simplicity at this stage, we assume zero time preference.




e (1=x)tu(c)dt = xu(c): (1)
That is, lifetime utility is the present value of her per-period utility u(c) dis-
countedformortalityatrate1=x. Inthisstationaryenvironment,consumption
is constant so that expected utility is the number of years an individual ex-
pects to live multiplied by per-period utility. We assume for now that period
utility depends only on consumption; in the next section, we will introduce
a quality-of-life term associated with health. Here and throughout the paper,
we normalize utility after death at zero.
Rosen (1988) pointed out the following important implication of a speci-
cation of utility involving life expectancy: When lifetime utility is per-period
utility, u, multiplied by life expectancy, the level of u matters a great deal. In
many other settings, adding a constant to u has no effect on consumer choice.
Here, adding a constant raises the value the consumer places on longevity
relative to consumption of goods. Negative utility also creates an anomaly
indifferencecurveshavethewrongcurvatureandtherst-orderconditionsdo
not maximize utility. As long as u is positive, preferences are well behaved.1
The representative individual receives a constant ow of resources y that
can be spent on consumption or health:
c + h = y: (2)
1Rosen also discussed the following issue: If the elasticity of utility rises above one for
low values of consumptionas it can for the preferences we estimate in this papermortality
becomes a good rather than a bad. A consumer would achieve a higher expected utility by
accepting higher mortality and the correspondingly higher level of later consumption. Thus
one cannot take expected utility for a given mortality rate as an indicator of the welfare of an
individual who can choose a lower rate. This issue does not arise in our work, because we
consider explicit optimization over the mortality rate. An opportunity for improvement of the
type Rosen identied would mean that we had not maximized expected utility.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 9
The economy has no physical capital or foreign trade that permits shifting
resources from one period to another.
Finally,ahealthproductionfunctiongovernstheindividual'sstateofhealth:
x = f(h): (3)
The social planner chooses consumption and health spending to maximize
the utility of the individual in (1) subject to the resource constraint (2) and




f(h)u(c) s:t: c + h = y: (4)
The optimal allocation equates the ratio of health spending to consumption
to the ratio of the elasticities of the health production function and the ow
utility function. With s  h=y, the optimum is
s






where h  f0(h)h
x, and c  u0(c) c
u.
Now suppose we ignore the fact that income and life expectancy are taken
as constant in this static model and instead consider what happens if income
grows. The short-cut of using a static model to answer a dynamic question
anticipates the ndings of our full dynamic model quite well.
Theresponseofthehealthsharetorisingincomedependsonthemovements
of the two elasticities in equation (5). The crux of our argument is that the
consumption elasticity falls relative to the health elasticity as income rises,
causing the health share to rise. Health is a superior good because satiation
occurs more rapidly in non-health consumption.
Why is c decreasing in consumption? In most branches of applied eco-
nomics, only marginal utility matters. For questions of life and death, how-
ever, thisisnotthecase. Wehavenormalizedtheutilityassociatedwithdeath10 HALL AND JONES
at zero in our framework, and how much a person will pay to live an extra
year hinges on the level of utility associated with life. In our application,
adding a constant to the ow of utility u(c) has a material effectit permits
the elasticity of utility to vary with consumption.
Thus our approach is to take the standard constant-elastic specication for
marginal utility but to add a constant to the level of utility. In this way, we
stay close to the approach of many branches of applied economics that make
good use of a utility function with constant elasticity for marginal utility. In
nance, it has constant relative riskaversion. In dynamic macroeconomics, it
has constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In the economics of the
household, it has constant elasticity of substitution between pairs of goods.
What matters for the choice of health spending, however, is not just the
elasticity of marginal utility, but also the elasticity of the ow utility func-
tion itself. With the constant term added to a utility function with constant-
elastic marginal utility, the utility elasticity declines with consumption for
conventional parameter values. The resulting specication is then capable of
explaining the rising share of health spending.
We specify ow utility as:




Based on evidence discussed later in the paper, we consider  > 1 to be
likely. In this case, the base level of utility, b, needs to be positive and large
enoughtoensurethatowutilityisalwayspositive. Theowofutilityu(c)is
then bounded because the exponent on consumption is negative. This means
the elasticity c is decreasing in consumption. More generally, any bounded
utility function u(c) will deliver a declining elasticity, at least eventually, as
willtheunboundedu(c) = + logc. Thusthekeytoourexplanationofthe
rising health share  a marginal utility of consumption that falls sufcientlyTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 11
quickly  is obtained by adding a constant to a standard class of utility
functions.
Analternativeinterpretationoftherst-orderconditionisalsoinformative.
Let L(c;x)  U(c;x)=u0(c) denote the value of a life in units of output.
Then, the optimal allocation of resources can also be characterized as




The optimal health share is proportional to the value of a year of life L=x
divided by per-capita income. If the ow of utility is given as in equation (6),







For  > 1, the growth rate of the value of a life year approaches  times
the growth rate of consumption from above. Therefore, the value of a year
of life will grow faster than consumption (and income) if  is larger than 1.
According to equation (7), this is one of the key ingredients needed for the
model to generate a rising health share.
Arapidly-declining marginal utilityofconsumption leadsto a risinghealth
share provided the health production elasticity h does not itself fall too
rapidly. For example, if the marginal product of health spending in extending
lifeweretofalltozerosayitwastechnologicallyimpossibletolivebeyond
theageof100thenhealthspendingwouldceasetoriseatthatpoint. Aswe
discuss later, for the kind of health production functions that match the data,
the production elasticity declines very gradually, and the declining marginal
utilityofconsumptiondoesindeed dominate, producingarisinghealthshare.
Finally, we can also generalize the utility function to U(c;x) in place of
xu(c),sothatlifetimesatisfactionisnotnecessarilyproportionaltothelength
of the lifetime. The solution for this case is s=(1   s) = hx=c, where
x  Uxx=U is the elasticity of utility with respect to life expectancy. Our12 HALL AND JONES
result, then, isthatthehealthshareriseswhentheconsumptionelasticityfalls
faster than the product of the production and life expectancy elasticities. As
just one example U(c;x) = xu(c) delivers a constant x even with sharply
diminishing returns to life expectancy (that is,  close to zero), so our main
results are unchanged in this case.
The simple model develops intuition, but it falls short on a number of
dimensions. Most importantly, the model assumes constant total resources
and constant health productivity. This means it is inappropriate to use this
model to study how a growing income leads to a rising health share, the
comparative static results not withstanding. Still, the basic intuition for a
risinghealthshareemergesclearly. Thehealthsharerisesovertimeasincome
grows if the joy associated with living an extra year does not diminish as
quickly as the marginal utility of consumption.
4. THE FULL DYNAMIC MODEL
We turn now to the full dynamic model, allowing age-specic mortality
and the associated heterogeneity, as well as growth in total resources and
productivity growth in the health sector. This model also incorporates a
quality-of-life component associated with health spending.
An individual of age a in period t has an age-specic state of health, xa;t.
As in the basic model, the mortality rate for an individual is the inverse of her
health status. Therefore, 1   1=xa;t is the per-period survival probability of
an individual with health xa;t.
An individual's state of health is produced by spending on health ha;t:
xa;t = f(ha;t;a;t): (9)
Inthisproductionfunction,healthstatusdependsonbothageandtime. Forces
outsidethemodelthatvarywithageandtimemayalsoinuencehealthstatus;
examples include technological change and education.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 13
The starting point for our specication of preferences is the ow utility of
theindividual,ua;t(ca;t;xa;t). Inadditiontodependingonconsumption,ow
utility depends on health status, xa;t. Spending on health therefore affects
utility in two ways, by increasing the quantity of life through a mortality
reduction and by increasing the quality of life.
For reasons that will become clear in the empirical section, we also allow
ow utility to depend on both time and age. For simplicity, we assume the
time and age effects are additive, so that
ua;t(ca;t;xa;t) = ba;t + u(ca;t;xa;t) (10)
Hereba;t isthebasevalueofowutilityforapersonofageaandu(ca;t;xa;t)
isthepartthatvarieswiththecurrentconsumptionandhealthstatus. Further-














status and consumption are additively separable in utility and that quality of
life is a constant-elasticity function of health status.
In this environment, we consider the allocation of resources that would be
chosen by a social planner who places equal weights on each person alive at
a point in time and who discounts future ows of utility at rate . Let Na;t






The optimal allocation of resources is a choice of consumption and health
spending at each age that maximizes social welfare subject to the production14 HALL AND JONES
function for health in (9) and subject to a resource constraint we will specify
momentarily.
It is convenient to express this problem in the form of a Bellman equation.
Let Vt(Nt) denote the social planner's value function when the age distribu-
tion of the population is the vector Nt  (N1;t;N2;t;:::;Na;t;:::). Then the

















N0;t = N0; (16)
xa;t = f(ha;t;a;t): (17)
yt+1 = egyyt; (18)
The rst constraint is the economy-wide resource constraint. Note that we
assume that people of all ages contribute the same ow of resources, yt. The
second is the law of motion for the population. We assume a large enough
population so that the number of people aged a + 1 next period can be taken
equal to the number aged a today multiplied by the survival probability. The
third constraint species that births are exogenous and constant at N0. The
nal two constraints are the production function for health and the law of
motion for resources, which grow exogenously at rate gy.
Let t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. The
optimal allocation satises the following rst order conditions for all a:








+ ux(ca;t;xa;t)f0(ha;t) = t; (20)
where we use f0(ha;t) to represent @f(ha;t;a;t)=@ha;t. That is, the marginal
utility of consumption and the marginal utility of health spending are equated
across people and to each other at all times. This condition together with
the additive separability of ow utility implies that people of all ages have
the same consumption ct at each point in time, but they have different health
expenditures ha;t depending on age.
Letva;t  @Vt
@Na;t denotethechangeinsocialwelfareassociatedwithhaving
an additional person of age a alive. That is, va;t is the social value of life at













benet of saving a life to its marginal cost. The marginal benet is the sum
of two terms. The rst is the social value of life va+1;t+1=uc. The second
is the additional quality of life enjoyed by people as a result of the increase
in health status.
The marginal cost of saving a life is dh=dm, where dh is the increase in
resources devoted to health care and dm is the reduction in the mortality rate.
For example, if reducing the mortality rate by .001 costs $2000, then saving






status is dened as inverse mortality, m = 1=x so that dm = dx=x2. In the
previous example, we required 1=dm people to reduce their mortality rate
by dm to save a life. Equivalently, setting dx = 1, we require x2 people to
increase their health status by one unit in order to save a statistical life. Since16 HALL AND JONES
the cost of increasing x is dh=dx = 1=f0(h), the marginal cost of saving a
life is therefore x2=f0(h).
By taking the derivative of the value function, we nd that the social value
of life satises the recursive equation:






va+1;t+1 + t(yt   ct   ha;t):(22)
The additional social welfare associated with having an extra person alive at
age a is the sum of three terms. The rst is the level of ow utility enjoyed by
that person. The second is the expected social welfare associated with having
a person of age a + 1 alive next period, where the expectation employs the
survivalprobability1 1=xa;t. Finally, thelasttermisthenetsocialresource
contribution from a person of age a, her production less her consumption and
health spending.
The literature on competing risks of mortality suggests that a decline in
mortality from one cause may increase the optimal level of spending on other
causes, as discussed by Dow, Philipson and Sala-i-Martin (1999). This prop-
erty holds in our model as well. Declines in future mortality will increase the
value of life, va;t, raising the marginal benet of health spending at age a.
4.1. Relation to the Static Model
It is worth pausing for a moment to relate this full dynamic model to the
simple static framework. With constant income y, a time- and age-invariant
health production function f(h),  = 1, and a ow utility function that
dependsonlyonconsumption,theBellmanequationforarepresentativeagent
can be written as
V (y) = max
c;h
u(c) + (1   1=f(h))V (y) s.t. c + h = y: (23)THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 17
Given the stationarity of this environment, it is straightforward to see that the
value function is
V (y) = max
c;h
f(h)u(c) s.t. c + h = y; (24)
the static model we developed earlier, restated in discrete time.
5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In the remainder of the paper, we estimate the parameters of our model
and provide a quantitative analysis of its predictions. We are conscious of
uncertainty in the literature regarding the values of many of the parameters
in our model. The calculations that follow should be viewed as illustrative
and suggestive, and we have done our best to indicate the range of outcomes
one would obtain with other plausible values of the parameters. We begin by
describing the data we use, then proceed to estimating the parameter values,
and nally conclude with solving the model.
We assume a period in the model is ve years in the data. We organize the
data into 20 ve-year age groups, starting at 04 and ending at 9599. We
consider 11 time periods in the historical period, running from 1950 through
2000.
We obtained data on age-specic mortality rates from Table 35 of National
Vital Statistics Report Volume 51, Number 3 United States Life Tables, 2000,
December19,2002,CenterforDiseaseControl. Thissourcereportsmortality
rates every 10 years, with age breakdowns generally in 10-year intervals. We
interpolated by time and age groups to produce estimates for 5-year time
intervals and age categories. We also obtained data on age-specic mortality
rates due to accidents and homicides from Health, United States 2004 and
from various issues of Vital Statistics of the United States.
Dataonage-specichealthspendingistakenfromMeara,WhiteandCutler
(2004). These data are for 1963, 1970, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2000. Using18 HALL AND JONES
the age breakdowns for these years, we distributed national totals for health
spending across age categories, interpolated to our 5-year time intervals.
National totals for health spending are from Table 2.5.5 of the revised
National Income and Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
accessed at bea.gov on February 13, 2004 (for private spending) and Table
3.15 of the previous NIPAs, accessed December 2, 2003 (for government
spending). Data on government purchases of health services are no longer
reported in the accounts. The empirical counterpart for our measure, y, of
total resources is total private consumption plus total government purchases
of goods and services, from the sources described above.
6. ESTIMATING THE HEALTH PRODUCTION FUNCTION
We begin by assuming a functional form for the production function for
health status. Our main approach treats mortality from accidents and homi-
cides as exogenous and assumes health inputs affect non-accident mortal-
ity. The distinction between the two categories is especially important for
older children and young adults, where health-related mortality is so low that
declines in accidents account for a substantial part of the overall trend in
mortality. We assume that the inverse of the non-accident mortality rate 
~ xa;t  1=mnon
a;t  is a Cobb-Douglas function of health inputs:
~ xa;t = Aa (ztha;twa;t)
a : (25)
In this production function, Aa and a are parameters that are allowed to
depend on age. zt is the efciency of a unit of output devoted to health
care, taken as an exogenous trend; it is the additional improvement in the
productivity of health care on top of the general trend in the productivity of
goods production. The unobserved variable wa;t captures the effect of all
other determinants of mortality, including education and pollution.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 19
The production function for overall health is therefore:








a;t + 1=~ xa;t
; (26)
where macc is the exogenous mortality rate from accidents and homicides.
6.1. Identication
To explain our approach to identifying the parameters of this production
function Aa and a  we introduce a new variable, sa;t  ha;t=yt, the
ratio of age-specic health spending to income per capita. We rewrite our
health production function as
~ xa;t = Aa(ztyt  sa;t  wa;t)a: (27)
The overall trend decline in age-specic mortality between 1950 and 2000
can then be decomposed into the three terms in parentheses. First is a trend
due to technological change, ztyt. In our benchmark scenario, we assume
technical change in the health sector occurs at the same rate as in the rest of
the economy, so that zt = 1 is constant. Because yt rises in our data at 2.31
percent per year, this is the rate of technical change assumed to apply in the
health sector. In a robustness check, we assume technical change is faster in
the health sector, allowing zt to grow at one percent per year so that technical
change in the health sector is 3.31 percent.
The second cause of a trend decline in age-specic mortality is resource
allocation: as the economy allocates an increasing share of per capita income
tohealthspendingatagea, mortalitydeclines. Thiseffectiscapturedbysa;t.
Third, unobserved movements of wa;t cause age-specic mortality to de-
cline. We have already removed accidents and homicides from our mortality
measure, but increases in the education of the population, declines in pollu-
tion, and declines in smoking may all contribute to declines in mortality.
Thekeyassumptionthatallowsustoidentifya econometricallyisthatour
observed trends  technological change and resource allocation  account20 HALL AND JONES
for a known fraction  of the trend decline in age-specic mortality. For
example, in our benchmark case, we assume that technical change and the
increasedallocationofresourcestohealthtogetheraccountfor = 2=3ofthe
declineinnon-accidentmortality,leaving1/3tobeexplainedbyotherfactors.
As a robustness check, we also consider the case where these percentages are
50-50, so that  = 1=2. We rst discuss why this is a plausible identifying
assumption and then explain exactly how it allows us to estimate a.
A large body of research seeks to understand the causes of declines in mor-
tality. Newhouse and Friedlander (1980) is one of the early cross-sectional
studies documenting a low correlation between medical resources and health
outcomes. Subsequent work designed to solve the difcult identication
problem (more resources are needed where people are sicker) have gener-
ally supported this nding (Newhouse 1993, McClellan, McNeil and New-
house 1994, Skinner, Fisher and Wennberg 2001, Card, Dobkin and Maestas
2004, Finkelstein and McKnight 2005). This work often refers to at of
the curve medicine and emphasizes the low marginal benet of additional
spending. Ontheotherhand,eventhisliteratureemphasizesthatcertainkinds
ofspendingforexampletheeffectivecarecategoryofWennberg, Fisher
and Skinner (2002) that includes u vaccines, screening for breast and colon
cancer, and drug treatments for heart attack victims  can have important ef-
fects on health. Goldman and Cook (1984) attribute 40 percent of the decline
in mortality from heart disease between 1968 and 1976 to specic medical
treatments; Heidenreich and McClellan (2001) take this one step further and
conclude that the main reason for the decline in early mortality from heart
attacks during the last 20 years is the increased use of medical treatments. Of
course, a substantial part of medical treatments may include improvements
in technology (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler 1998). Skinner et
al. (2001) emphasize that technological advances have been responsible for
large average health benets in the U.S. population. Nevertheless, otherTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 21
factors including behavioral changes, increased education, and declines in
pollution have certainly contributed to the decline in mortality (Chay and
Greenstone 2003, Grossman 2005).
Whileitwouldbeastretchtosaythereisaconsensus, thisliteratureisgen-
erallyconsistentwiththeidentifyingassumptionmadehere. Inparticular,our
identifying assumption leads to the following decomposition of the sources
ofage-specicmortalitydecline. Averagedacrossouragegroups, 35percent
is due to technological change, 32 percent to increased resource allocation
to health, and 33 percent (by assumption) to other factors. In our robustness
check that assigns 50 percent to other factors, the split is 26 percent to tech-
nological change and 24 percent to increased resource allocation. When we
allow technical change to be a percentage point faster in the health sector,
40 percent of the mortality decline is due to technical change, 27 percent to
resource allocation, and 33 percent (by assumption) to unobserved factors.
Our assumption about the fraction  implies that there is a trend in the
unobservable wa;t that accounts for a fraction 1    of the improvement in
mortality in age group a. The ratio of the trend in the unobserved component
to the trend in the observed component based on technical change and rising
resources is
1 





(logztyt + logsa;t) + a;t; (28)
We also normalize a;t to have a zero mean. Movements in a;t may be
correlated with technical change and resource allocation, an issue we address
below.
Using this equation to remove the unobserved wa;t from the production
function, we have
log ~ xa;t = logAa +
a

(logztyt + logsa;t) + ~ a;t; (29)22 HALL AND JONES
where ~ a;t  aa;t is a mean-zero, trendless disturbance term in the produc-
tion function.
The absence of a trend in ~ a;t allows us to estimate a. We use a linear time
trendasaninstrumentinequation(29)toestimatethecoefcientonthesecond
term, a
 . Werecoverthetrueelasticitya fromthiscoefcientbymultiplying
by the known proportion . This adjustment removes the omitted-variable
bias that would otherwise cause us to overstate the elasticity.
Following this discussion, we use GMM to estimate Aa and a in equa-
tion (29). Our two orthogonality conditions are that ~ a;t has zero mean and
that is has zero covariance with a linear time trend. Because ha;t is strongly
trending, the trend instrument is strong and the resulting estimator has small
standard errors.
Figure 3 shows the GMM estimates of a, the elasticity of adjusted health
status, ~ x, with respect to health inputs, by age category. The groups with the
largest improvements in health status over the 50-year period, the very young
and the middle-aged, have the highest elasticities, ranging from 0.25 to 0.40.
The fact that the estimates of a generally decline with age, particularly at the
older ages, constitutes an additional source of diminishing returns to health
spending as life expectancy rises. For the oldest age groups, the elasticity of
health status with respect to health inputs is only 0.042.
Figure4showstheactualandttedvaluesfortworepresentativeagegroups.
Because the health technology has two parameters for each ageintercept
and slopethe equations are successful in matching the level and trend of
health status. The same is true in the other age categories.
From these estimates, we can calculate the marginal cost of saving a life
at each age. Before turning to these calculations, we provide a summary of
the empirical literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL), an alternative
measure of the same concept, from the benet side.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 23
FIGURE3. Estimatesoftheelasticityofhealthstatuswithrespecttohealth
inputs









Note: The height of each bar reports our estimate of a, the elasticity of adjusted health
status with respect to health inputs. The ranges at the top of the bars indicate  two
standard errors.
6.2. Evidence on the Value of a Statistical Life
Inevaluatingourresults,threedimensionsoftheVSLliteraturearerelevant.
We are interested in (i) the level of the VSL, (ii) the rate at which the VSL
changes over time, and (iii) how the VSL varies with age.
Most estimates of the level of the value of a statistical life are obtained by
measuring the compensating differential that workers receive in more dan-
gerous jobs. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide the most recent survey of this
evidence and nd estimates of the value of a statistical life that range from
$4 million to $9 million, in year 2000 prices.24 HALL AND JONES
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Age 65 − 69,
 right scale
Note: Thesolidlinesshowactualhealthinputshonthehorizontalaxisandhealth
status, x, on the vertical axis, for two age groups, 35-39 and 65-69, for the period
1950 through 2000. The dashed lines show the tted values from the estimated
production function for health.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 25
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) provide an alternative approach to es-
timating the VSL. Their research design exploits the fact that states took
differentialadvantage of the relaxation of federal mandatory speed limits that
occurred in 1987. They nd that a much lower number of $1.5 million (in
1997 prices) represents an upper bound on the VSL, suggesting that various
problems including omitted variable bias and selection problems account for
the higher estimates in the labor market literature.
Howdoesthevalueoflifechangeovertime? Recallthatarisingvalueoflife
iscrucialinthismodeltounderstandingtherisinghealthshare. Unfortunately,
there is relatively little empirical evidence on changes in the value of life over
time.
Costa and Kahn (2003) appear to provide the rst estimates from a consis-
tent set of data on changes in the value of life in the United States. They use
decennialcensusdatafrom1940to1980andestimatethevalueofastatistical
life in 1980 of $5.5 million (in 1990 dollars). Moreover, they nd that this
valuehasbeenrisingovertimeatarateequaltobetween1.5and1.7timesthe
growth rate of per capita GDP. Hammitt, Liu and Liu (2000) made a similar
studyforTaiwan,combiningatimeseriesofcross-sections,andtheyestimate
an elasticity of the value of a statistical life with respect to per capita GDP of
between2and3. Becauselifeexpectancyitselfgrowsrelativelyslowly, these
studies therefore support the key requirement in this paper that the value of a
year of life as a ratio to per capita income is rising over time, and provide an
estimate of how rapidly the rise occurs.
A different approach to estimating changes in the value of life nds the
opposite result, however. In addition to surveying the existing literature that
estimates the value of life at a point in time, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) also
conduct a meta-analysis to estimate the elasticity of this value with respect
to income. Looking across some 60 studies from 10 countries, they regress
the average value of life estimates from each study on a measure of average26 HALL AND JONES
income from each study and obtain an estimate of the elasticity of the dollar
value of life with respect to income of about 0.5 or 0.6, with a 95 percent
condence interval that is typically about 0.2 to 0.8. This nding appears to
beconsistentwithseveralotherestimatesfromdifferentmeta-analysisstudies
that are also summarized by Viscusi and Aldy.
Someadditionalinsightonthisissuecomesfromlookingbackatourmodel.
Recall that equation (8) in the simple model suggests that the value of life
as a ratio to life expectancy is roughly proportional to consumption raised to
the power . That is, in units of output, the value of a year of life grows with
c. One way of thinking about  is that it is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticityofsubstitution,whichrecentempiricalworkestimatestobelessthan
one. This suggests that  > 1, and in fact the values that Costa and Kahn
(about 1.6) and Hammitt, Liu, and Liu (about 2 or 3) nd accord well with
this interpretation. Kaplow (2003) puzzles over the low income elasticity
estimates from the meta-analysis literature for a similar reason; the recent
empiricalworkbyCostaandKahnandHammitt,Liu,andLiuhelpstoresolve
this puzzle, we think.
Finally, we turn to evidence on variation in the value of a statistical life
by age. Aldy and Viscusi (2003) summarize the existing empirical literature,
which primarily consists of contingent valuation studies. They go on to
provide their own age-specic estimates using the hedonic wage regression
approach. Qualitatively, they support the contingent valuation literature in
ndinganinverted-UshapeforVSLbyage. Quantitatively,theirmainnding
is that the value of life for a 30 to 40-year old is about $5.5 million while
the value of life for a 60-year old is about $2.5 to $3.0 million, a gradient of
about 1/2 across these age groups.
Tosummarize,wetakethefollowingstylizedfactsfromtheVSLliterature.
First, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the level of the VSL: it could
be as low as 1.25 million in the late 1980s, but could range much higher toTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 27
numbers like 5 million or more. These numbers are plausibly interpreted
as the value of life at some average age, which we will take to be the 35 to
39-yearolds. Second, recentestimatessuggestthattheVSLgrowsovertime,
at a rate something like 1.6 or 2 times the growth rate of income. Finally, it
appearsthattheVSLvarieswithageinaninverted-Upattern,witharelatively
gentle slope, falling by about 1/2 between the ages of 35 and 60.
6.3. The Marginal Cost of Saving a Life
Our estimates of the health production function allow us to calculate the
marginal cost of saving a life, given the observed allocation of resources.
Recall, fromthe discussionsurroundingequation (21), that this marginal cost
isx2=f0(h). Withourfunctionalformforthehealthtechnology, themarginal
cost of saving a life is h~ x=. This expression has a nice interpretation: ~ x
is the inverse of the non-accident mortality rate, so it can be thought of as
the number of living people per non-accident death. h is health spending per
person, so h~ x is the total amount of health spending per death. The division
by  adjusts for the fact that we are interested in the marginal cost of saving
a life, not the average. Importantly, this calculation only involves the health
production function. For this part of the paper, the preference side of the
model is irrelevant.
Table 1 shows this marginal cost of saving a life for various age groups.
Wecaninterprettheseresultsintermsofthethreendingsfromtheempirical
VSL literature. First, the marginal cost of saving the life of a 40-year old in
theyear2000wasabout$1.9million. Inourrobustnesschecks, thismarginal
cost reached as high as $2.5 million (in the case where a is identied with
theassumptionthatonly1/2ratherthan2/3ofdeclinesinmortalityaredueto
technicalchangeandresourceallocation). Thesenumbersareatthelowerend
of the level estimates of the VSL from the literature. If one believes the lower
numbers, this suggests that health spending was at approximately the right28 HALL AND JONES
TABLE 1.
The Marginal Cost of Saving a Life (thousands of 2000 dollars)
Robust Per Year of Growth
Maximum Life Saved Rate
Age 1950 1980 2000 2000 2000 19502000
0-4 10 160 590 (790) 8 7.8
10-14 270 2,320 9,830 (13,110) 150 7.2
20-24 1,170 3,840 8,520 (11,360) 153 4.0
30-34 500 2,120 4,910 (6,540) 107 4.6
40-44 160 740 1,890 (2,520) 52 4.9
50-54 70 330 1,050 (1,400) 38 5.4
60-64 50 280 880 (1,180) 47 5.9
70-74 40 280 790 (1,050) 66 6.2
80-84 40 340 750 (1,000) 123 6.1
90-94 50 420 820 (1,090) 373 5.6
Note: The middle columns of the table report estimates of the marginal cost of saving a life
for various age groups. These estimates are calculated as h~ x=, using the estimates of 
given in Figure 4 and using actual data on health spending and mortality by age. Standard
errors for these values based on the standard errors of a are small. The Robust Maximum
column shows the maximum marginal cost we obtained in the various robustness checks
described in the text. These values turned out to occur in the case where we assume that
50% of the decline in age-specic mortality is due to the unobserved trend in wa;t. The Per
Year of Life Saved column divides the cost of saving a life by life expectancy at that age.
The Growth Rate column reports the average annual growth rate between 1950 and 2000.
level as a whole for this age group in 2000. Alternatively, of course, if one
believes the higher estimates of the VSL from the literature, the calculation
from Table 1 would suggest that health spending for this group was too low.
The second-to-last column of the table provides an alternative view of the
marginal cost of saving a life by stating the cost per year of life saved. It
shows the cost of saving a statistical life in the year 2000, divided by life
expectancy at each age. For example, the marginal cost of saving an extra
year of life at age 50 is about $38,000. Interestingly, the cost of saving a life
year in the youngest age category is only about $8,000, while the cost forTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 29
savingalifeyearfortheoldestagesrisestowellabove$100,000. Wediscuss
the implications of this nding in a later section.
Finally, the last column of the table shows the growth rate for the marginal
cost of saving a life. Since the marginal cost is h~ x= and  is constant over
time,thesegrowthratesdonotdependatallontheestimatesof. Thegrowth
ratesareveryhigh,ontheorderof5percentperyear. Bycomparison,theem-
pirical VSL literature nds signicantly lower growth rates. Taking income
growthtobeabout2percentperyear, forexample, theincomeelasticityfrom
Costa and Kahn (2003) of about 1.6 suggests that the VSL grows at a rate of
2  1:6 = 3:2 percent per year. This implies that the value of life in 1950 or
1960 would have been much higher than the marginal cost of saving a life.
Therefore, the U.S. may have been spending too little on health prior to the
most recent decade, even taking the level of the VSL from the lower end of
the estimates.
7. ESTIMATING THE PREFERENCE PARAMETERS
We present results for two approaches. The rst treats the observed levels
of health spending as optimal and estimates the preference parameters. The
second estimates preference parameters from the evidence in the empirical
VSL literature; it implies that health spending was inefciently low until the
end of the 20th century.
7.1. Treating Observed Health Spending as Optimal
Our model contains the following preference parameters: the discount fac-
tor , the base levels of ow utility ba;t, the consumption parameter , the
quality-of-life parameter , and the weighting parameter . For the moment,
we consider the case where health status does not affect ow utility so that
 = 0. We will reintroduce quality-of-life shortly.30 HALL AND JONES
We have explored a variety of parametric restrictions on the base utility,
ba;t. These include making it a constant for all ages and years, making it
vary by age, and giving it a trend over time. The evidence in favor of age
effects is strong. There is evidence of trends in base utility, but not at the




Accordingly, we treat the values of ba;t as parameters themselves, without
imposing any restriction. Because there is one of these parameters for each
data point, estimation is a matter of solving for the values, not minimizing
a GMM norm or other criterion. Further, this means there are not enough
equations to estimate the other two parameters,  and . We use outside
evidence on these parameters before solving for the values of ba;t.
For the curvature parameter of the utility function, , we look to other
circumstances where curvature affects choice. Large literatures on intertem-
poralchoice(Hall1988),assetpricing(Lucas1994),andlaborsupply(Chetty
2005)eachsuggestthat = 2isareasonablevalue. Recallthathighervalues
of  lead to faster growth in the value of life and therefore would deliver even
more rapid growth in the health share than what follows. With respect to the
discount factor, , we choose a value that is consistent with this choice of 
and with a 5 percent real return to saving. Taking consumption growth from
the data of 2.08 percent per year, a standard Euler equation gives an annual
discount factor of 0.992, or, for the 5-year intervals in our model, 0.963.
Given the data and the values of a, , and , we rst calculate the implied
value of life from equation (21) and then recover the base levels of utility
from a rearranged version of equation (22). Figure 5 shows the results of the
calculations. Eachlineportraysthebaselevelofutilityforeveryagegroupin
a particular year, for the 11 years at 5-year intervals from 1950 though 2000.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 31
FIGURE 5. Estimates of base ow utility, ba;t










Note: Each line shows the cross section of base levels of utility in a given year. The periods
cover5yearseachfrom1950through2000. TheheavydashedlinelabeledSolvedreports
the set of base values inferred from the value of life in 2000 according to the model.
Thelinesshareacommonpatternnegativeowutilityintheyoungestgroup
and usually in the second-youngest group, and also negative ow utility for
teenagers. Negativity of ow utility does not contradict any principles of the
model. The motivation for continuing to live is to capture next period's value
oflife. Negativeowutilitymarksadifcultperiodoflifethatpeoplechoose
to live through so that they can enjoy later periods with positive utility. For
older people, ow utility stabilizes at a common, lower positive level over all
periods. Flow utility rises somewhat for the very elderly.
Alternatively,wecaninterpretthesolvedvaluesforba;tastheresidualsfrom
therst-orderconditioninamodelwithaconstantb. Economically,theyarise
because the marginal cost of saving a lifethe right side of equation (21),32 HALL AND JONES
with values shown in Table 1varies considerably more across ages than
the value of life on the preference side would in the absence of variation in
b. That is, with a constant b across ages, the value of life on the preference
sidetheleftsideofequation(21)turnsouttoberelativelyatacrossages.
For example, consider the marginal cost of saving a life reported in Table 1.
The way the model interprets the fact that we spend so little on health care
for children from 0 to 4 and so much on those between 5 and 9, relative to
the marginal mortality reductions from spending, is by having a substantially
lower b for the younger group.
In the alternative interpretation of the estimates of ba;t as residuals, they
could be seen as measures, at different times, of the misallocation of health
care. The institutions that govern the delivery of health care may systemat-
ically fail to take advantage of opportunities to reduce infant mortality, for
example. This interpretation helps explain our nding that the ba;t do vary
over time, contrary to the hypothesis that they are unchanging parameters of
preferences.
These calculations provide estimates of the base level of utility during the
historical period. For our projections for the next 50 years, we need future
values of the base utility parameters. For this purpose, we make use of
additional information, namely the level of the value of life in utility units
from equation (21) in the last historical year, 2000. This level information
is not used in the calculation of the historical values of ba;t from equation
(22), which is in difference form. To make use of the level information, we
hypothesize that ba;t will not change over the future from its values in 2000.
This hypothesis makes sense, because there is no systematic trend in the
historical values in Figure 5. Then we proceed in the following way: When
we solve the model for the years 2000 through 2095, we treat ba as a set of
unknowns to solve and then require that the model solution match the value
of life in 2000. The heavy dashed line in Figure 5 shows these solved values.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 33
Except for the more erratic values for the younger groups, the match is quite
good.
7.2. Matching the Earlier Value of Life Estimates
As an alternative approach to estimating the preference parameters, we
drop the assumption that the observed data are generated by maximizing
social welfare given our estimated health technology. Instead, we take the
age-specic spending data and the consumption data as given and compute
the value of life at each age, va+1;t+1=uc, from these data. For future values
of health spending by age, we project the existing data forward at a constant
growth rate. Until the year 2020, this growth rate is the average across the
age-specic spending growth rates. After 2020 we assume spending grows
at the rate of income growth. The rate must slow at some point; otherwise
the health share rises above one. Our results are similar if we delay the date
of the slowdown to 2050.
We then estimate a constant and common value ba;t = b and the curvature
parameter  to match some estimates from the VSL literature. Our baseline
scenario features a value of life for 3539 year olds of $2 million in 1987.
We project this back to 1950 and forward to 2000, using a growth rate of
1:6  2:31 = 3:70 percent per year, based on the Costa and Kahn income
elasticity. By matching the value of life for this age group in 1950 and 2000,
we obtain b = 21:637 and  = 1:624 for the case where health status does
not affect ow utility (i.e.  = 0). Finally, we recalibrate the time discount
factor  to an interest rate of 5 percent based on this new value of .
7.3. The Quality-of-Life Parameters
Tocalibratethequality-of-lifeparameters and,wedrawupontheexten-
sive literature on quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), elicited by surveying
sick and healthy people, medical experts, and otherssee Fryback et al.34 HALL AND JONES
(1993) and Cutler and Richardson (1997). This work focuses on the QALY
weight, the ow utility level of a person with a particular disease as a fraction
of the ow utility level of a similar person in perfect health. Surveys ask
people what probability p of perfect health with probability 1   p of certain
death would make them indifferent to their current health or what fraction of
a year of future perfect health would make them indifferent to a year in their
current health status. Both of these measures correspond to the relative ow
utility in our framework.
Cutler and Richardson (1997) estimate QALY weights by age. With new-
borns normalized to have a weight of unity, they nd QALY weights of 0.94,
0.73, and 0.62 for people of ages 20, 65, and 85, in the year 1990. We use
these gures to estimate  and . For the case where ba;t is constant across










for t = 1990 to solve for  and . Because the value of life itself depends on
these parameters, we estimate the utility parameters b and  at the same time.
The resulting values are  = 1:922,  = 1:051, b = 54:17, and  = 1:593.
With four equations and four unknowns, estimation is a matter of solving for
the values, so there are no standard errors.
In addition to the QALY interpretation, these numbers can be judged in
another way. They imply that a 65 year-old would give up 88 percent of her
consumption,andan85year-oldwouldgiveup93percentofherconsumption
to have the health status of a 20 year-old. The intuition behind these large
numbers is the sharp diminishing returns to consumption measured by . To
explain what may seem to be a small difference in relative utilities of .94
versus .73 requires large differences in consumption. Health is extremely
valuable.THE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 35
8. SOLVING THE MODEL
We now solve the model over the sample period 1950 through 2000 and
also project the economy out to the year 2050. We solve the model using
both of our approaches to calibrating the preferences parameters (the ba;t and
) and using two approaches to the quality of life ( = 0 and  > 0). For
the historical period, we take resources per person, y, at its actual value. For
the projections, we use the historical growth rate for the sample period, 2.31
percent per year. The details for the numerical solution of the model are
available from either author's website.
Figure 6 shows the calculated share of health spending over the period
1950 through 2050. A rising health share is a robust feature of the optimal
allocation of resources in the health model. The key force at work in the
model behind this result is that the marginal utility of consumption in a given
periodfallsrapidly. AstheU.S.getsricherandricher,themostvaluablething
people can purchase is more time to live.
The gure shows a substantial difference between projected health shares
for the two approaches. Our rst approach matches the actual health share
between 1950 and 2000 exactly. The projection based on that approach im-
pliesarapidlygrowinghealthshareinthefuture,reaching33percentin2050.
The second approach, based on the VSL estimates in the literature, produces
a much atter health share. Fundamentally, this slower rate of increase is
driven by the lower value of  (1.6 versus 2.0) used in our second approach;
recall that  governs the growth rate of the value of life and therefore de-
termines the growth rate of the health share. This second approach suggests
underspendingonhealthforthelast50yearsandgeneratesahealthsharethat
reaches 29 percent in 2050.
Weconductanumberofrobustnesscheckstoillustratehowourbenchmark
results change when key parameter values are varied in plausible ways. For
example,Figure6alsoshowswhathappenswhenhealthqualityaffectsutility.36 HALL AND JONES
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Circles o show actual data for the health share. The steeply-sloping line for the period
2005-2050 show the projected health share assuming  = 2, where the ba preference
parametersareinferredfromtreatingthehistoricaldataasifitweregeneratedbythemodel.
The gently sloping lines for the period 1950-2050 show the hypothetical historical and
projected share for preferences inferred from the VSL literature (e.g.  = 1:62). Within
thesetwoapproaches, theupperlinecorrespondstothecase thatincludesaquality-of-life
term ( > 0), while the lower line does not ( = 0).
Our calibration of  and  for this case implies a high willingness to pay for
health quality. As a result, overall health spending is higher in this scenario.
While our benchmark case leads to an optimal health share of just under 20
percent in 2000, allowing for quality of life in utility raises the share to 28
percent. The overall trend in the health share is quite similar.
Figure 7 shows several other robustness checks. Allowing for technical
change in the health sector to be one percentage point faster than in the
rest of the economy or reducing the share of mortality decline explained by
technical change and resource allocation from 2/3 to 1/2 deliver relativelyTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 37













  Faster Tech. Matching VSL:
 50% health
Matching VSL:
   $3 million
     Optimal:
50% and Tech.
Year
                  Health Share,  s
Circles o show actual data for the health share. This graph shows ve alternative
simulations. For two of these alternatives, Faster Tech. and 50% health, we consider
both the approach that treats observed spending as optimal and the approach that matches
a value of life in 1987 of $2 million. Faster Tech. assumes that technical change in the
health sector is 1 percentage point faster than in the rest of the economy. 50% health
assumes that 1/2 of the decline in age-specic mortality (rather than our baseline value
of 2/3) is due to technological change and increased resource allocation. Finally, the fth
case matches a value of life in 1987 for the 3539 year olds of $3 million.
similar results. In both of these cases, less of the decline in age-specic
mortality is due to health spending, so the estimates of a in the production
function are smaller. Since health spending runs into sharper diminishing
returns, the overall health share of spending is lower. These simulations
suggest that the observed share in the year 2000 was roughly optimal.
Alternatively, another robustness check in the gure assumes the value of a
stastical life is $3 million dollars in 1987 rather than $2 million. This means
the marginal benet of health spending is higher, so the simulation delivers38 HALL AND JONES
FIGURE 8. Health Spending by Age













scenario in which b and  are chosen to match estimates from the VSL literature.
a substantially higher health share. In 2000, for example, the optimal health
share is 26 percent, and it rises to 36 percent by 2050.
Figure 8 examines the micro data underlying the health share. This gure
shows actual and simulated health spending by age, for 1950, 2000, and 2050
for our second approach in the baseline scenario (in the rst approach, actual
and simulated spending are equated by construction). A comparison of the
results for the year 2000 shows that actual and optimal spending are fairly
similar for most ages, with two exceptions. Optimal health spending on the
youngest age group is substantially higher than actual spending: given the
high mortality rate in this group, the marginal benet of health spending is
very high, as was shown earlier. Similarly, while optimal health spending
generally rises until age 80, it declines after that point. It is worth noting inTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 39
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See notes to Figures 6 and 7. Life expectancy is calculated using the cross-section distri-
bution of mortality rates at each point in time.
this respect that the underlying micro data we use for health spending groups
all ages above 75 together, so we do not know what the actual pattern of
spending looks like above the age of 75.
Figure 9 shows the actual and projected levels of life expectancy at birth
for all eight of our simulation runs. The rst thing to note in the gure
is the overall similarity of the life expectancy numbers. Because there are
such sharp diminishing returns to health spending in our health production
function,relativelylargedifferencesinhealthspendingleadtorelativelysmall
differences in life expectancy. A second thing to note is that the projected
path does not grow quite as fast as historical life expectancy. The reason is
again related to the relatively sharp diminishing returns to health spending
that we estimate.40 HALL AND JONES
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A model based on standard economic assumptions yields a strong predic-
tion for the health share. Provided the marginal utility of consumption falls
sufciently rapidlyas it does for an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
well under onethe optimal health share rises over time. The rising health
share occurs as consumption continues to rise, but consumption grows more
slowly than income. The intuition for this result is that in any given period,
peoplebecomesaturatedinnon-healthconsumption,drivingitsmarginalutil-
itytolowlevels. Aspeoplegetricher, themostvaluablechannelforspending
is to purchase additional years of life.
This fundamental mechanism in the model is supported empirically in a
number of different ways. First, as discussed earlier, it is consistent with
conventionalestimatesoftheintertemporalelasticityofsubstitution. Second,
the mechanism predicts that the value of a statistical life should rise faster
thanincomeovertime; CostaandKahn(2003)andHammittetal.(2000)nd
thistobe thecase. Cross-countryevidence alsosuggeststhathealth spending
rises more than one-for-one with income; this evidence is summarized by
Gerdtham and Jonsson (2000).
One source of evidence that runs counter to our prediction is the micro
evidence on health spending and income. At the individual level within the
United States, for example, income elasticities appear to be substantially less
than one, as discussed by Newhouse (1992). A serious problem with this
existing evidence, however, is that health insurance limits the choices facing
individuals, potentially explaining the absence of income effects. Our model
makesastrongpredictionthatifonelookshardenoughandcarefullyenough,
one ought to be able to see income effects in the micro data. Future empirical
work will be needed to judge this prediction. A suggestive informal piece
of evidence is that exercise seems to be a luxury good: among people withTHE VALUE OF LIFE AND HEALTH SPENDING 41
sedentary jobs, high wage people seem to spend more time exercising than
low wage people, despite the higher opportunity cost of their time.
As mentioned in the introduction, the recent health literature has empha-
sized the importance of technological change as an explanation for the rising
health share. In our view, this is a proximate rather than a fundamental ex-
planation. The development of new and expensive medical technologies is
surely part of the process of rising health spending, as the literature suggests;
Jones (2003) provides a model along these lines with exogenous technical
change. However, a more fundamental analysis looks at the reasons that new
technologies are developed. Distortions associated with health insurance in
the United States are probably part of the answer, as suggested by Weisbrod
(1991). But the fact that the health share is rising in virtually every advanced
country in the worlddespite wide variation in systems for allocating health
caresuggests that deeper forces are at work. A fully-worked out techno-
logical story will need an analysis on the preference side to explain why it
is useful to invent and use new and expensive medical technologies. The
most obvious explanation is the model we propose in this paper: new and
expensive technologies are valued because of the rising value of life.
Viewed from every angle, our results support the proposition that both
historical and future increases in the health spending share are desirable.
The magnitude of the future increase depends on parameters whose values
are known with relatively low precision, including the value of life, how
rapidly that value has grown over time, and the fraction of the decline in age-
specic mortality that is due to technical change and the increased allocation
ofresourcestohealthcare. Nevertheless,webelieveitlikelythatmaximizing
socialwelfareintheUnitedStateswillrequirethedevelopmentofinstitutions
that are consistent with spending 30 percent or more of GDP on health by the
middle of the century.42 HALL AND JONES
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